In this reflective piece on the language of law, I take a look at how learning disabled people are spoken about in the English court system, with examples from judges, coroners, lawyers and court experts.
I start with a quick look at the broader context, which is that we appear to have a legal system that is at times apathetic to the language used and the respect due to learning disabled people and others who receive social care support.
Admin above risk
A very casual example is the words of HHJ Paul Matthews sitting as a judge in the high court at the business and property court in Bristol earlier this year.
The case involved the liquidation of a care company, Mannarest Ltd, which ran the Dewi-Sant Residential Home in Plymouth. This residential care home for older people with dementia had its registration cancelled – and was therefore closed down – after a Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspection found it to be inadequate in every aspect.
There were 10 breaches of legal regulations. A fine was imposed because the registered manager and provider had not informed CQC of “notifiable events” (safety concerns, for example).
The care home’s dealings with the CQC are painted as the difficulty, not the unsafe care provided
Registration was cancelled owing to many failings including to record best interest decisions, provide safe care and treatment to people with epilepsy, reduce risks of choking and manual handling, properly and safely manage medicines and ensure people were safe from abuse and improper treatment.
HHJ Paul Matthews wrapped all of this up into the following statement: “Because of difficulties which the company had in its dealings with the Care Quality Commission, the number of residents at the home fell to a level which was economically unsustainable. The company ceased trading in March 2023 and, the following month, entered creditors’ voluntary liquidation, when the joint liquidators were appointed.”
This statement paints the care home’s dealings with the CQC as the difficulty, not the unsafe care the home provided.
Mindless, autistic – or not?
In another case in May 2025, two men, Daniel Graham and Adam Carruthers, were on trial for criminal damage after felling the tree that stood in Sycamore Gap at Hadrian’s Wall in Northumberland.
The media widely reported that the Crown Prosecution Service prosecutor, Richard Wright KC, described the two men as being on a “moronic mission” of “mindless thuggery”. This ableist language, however, was not repeated in the sentencing remarks of Mrs Justice Lambert DBE.
In February this year, Jon Rubens, a former vet who ran a Christian summer camp for children in Leicestershire, was sentenced for child cruelty and sexual offences.
During his sentencing hearing, his defence lawyer, Thomas Schofield KC, seemed to casually suggest perhaps his client might be mentally unwell, autistic or both.
The BBC reported Schofield telling the court: “He suffers from a personality disorder, or autism – or a combination of all of them. They don’t afford him any excuse, but they may have contributed to his offending or thought processes when it came to offending.”
Yet there had been no expert report submitted to suggest that the man had experienced mental ill health or was autistic.
Defined by diagnosis
Often people are described in very medicalised language or as holding a long list of labels and diagnoses.
Last year, in a court of protection case (XY, Re) discussing welfare deputies and how their powers interact with the court, the subject of the welfare deputyship was described as “now 29 years old. He has a complex constellation of diagnoses involving autism, OCD, mild/borderline learning disability, PTSD, ADHD, pathological demand avoidance, interoception difficulties, and anxiety. His lack of capacity in relevant respects is agreed by all parties.”
That same year, in another court of protection case (JF v London Borough of Hackney & Anor), the mother of a young learning disabled woman, JF, tried to convince the court a transparency order (allowing reporting of the case) that had been made six years earlier was no longer required.
JF was described as “a young woman with diagnoses of severe learning disability, autism, previous epilepsy, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, hyperkinetic disorder, limited verbal communication skills and significant support needs, including the need for constant monitoring during the day and night. She is a party to those proceedings, acting through a litigation friend, the official solicitor.”
In March 2026, the family court heard a case about reinstating parental contact between a mother and her nine-year-old child, A (M v LBB & Anor).
After the mother served a prison sentence for child cruelty to A, this is how A was described: “She was a child who suffered a hypoxic brain injury, in circumstances which are wholly unclear, when she was only a few weeks old. That has left her with complex multiple disabilities. She effectively has no vision except for some light, possibly some colour. She is physically disabled although can sometimes use her legs to a limited extent with support but quickly becomes tired and requires the use of a wheelchair. She has a learning disability.”
It seems astonishing that a court would dismiss outdated and ableist language – used in a care home – as a ‘clumsy’ choice of words
The description went on like this until ending with these words: “She is also a child who is lively, delightful, responsive, affectionate, particularly with anyone who can give her one-to-one attention.”
Imagine if this description had come first, before the long list of issues “suffered” by the child?
In the upper tribunal administrative appeals chamber, it was successfully argued that the Disclosure and Barring Service had placed RW’s name on lists banning her from working with vulnerable adults or children based on factual mistakes (RW v Disclosure and Barring Service).
RW had been found to have acted in an abusive way towards AG, who had a learning disability. The court heard RW give her account and believed her. AG was not called as a witness.
Here is an extract from the hearing: “We note that the DBS made much of RW referring to AG ‘misbehaving’, suggesting that this indicated that she failed to recognise AG’s persistent demands for attention as being associated with his learning disability.
“We had the benefit of hearing RW’s oral evidence. She sometimes struggled to find the right words and used terms that jarred. For instance, she referred to AG as ‘a Down’s syndrome’.
“However, we did not infer from the words RW used that she had a callous attitude towards AG. Rather, we found that RW was sometimes just a bit clumsy in her choice of words. This was most likely as a result of her own learning disability, which she was able to describe as relating to her cognitive abilities and language/vocabulary.”
It seems astonishing that a court would dismiss outdated and ableist language – in a care home – as a “clumsy” choice of words.
These are just a few examples that reflect how the legal system could benefit from some deep reflection on its ableism and on how learning disabled people are spoken about in court, and described in judgements. n
Cases
JF v London Borough of Hackney & Anor [2025] EWCOP 48 (T1).
